With the ubiquitous deployment of large scale networks more and more complex human interactions are supported by computer applications. This poses new challenges on the expressiveness of security policy design systems, often requiring the use of new security paradigms.
Introduction
The growing number of Internet users and services raises constantly new challenges for defining and ensuring adequate security policies. Most policies implement solely access control barriers, based on the concepts of permission or prohibition, but the current expansion of electronic business will stress, in a near future, the needs for more sophisticated security policies. In particular, we believe that the concept of obligation will have an increasing importance for the expressiveness of such policies. The need for ensuring obligation has already been recognized by several authors [4] and is illustrated by the following examples.
Consider that Alice submits her tax form via Internet and, once she has done that, she immediately receives a taxID that she has to send, via email, to her boss. In other words, Alice is obliged to send her taxID to her boss; otherwise her tax form submission is not accepted.
Another illustrating example is when Alice registers herself, via a web server, as a student of Online University. Once she has done that, she is obliged to register herself as a student of, at least, a discipline chosen from a set of available disciplines. On the other hand, Alice could first register herself in a discipline; in this case she is then obliged to register as a student of the Online University.
These two examples show that the traditional obligation we are familiar with, e.g. forcing Alice to register before loading some software, is not always adequate. The reason is that either the action that Alice has to perform depends on her previous actions (e.g. taxID depends on the previous form submission) or Alice has to perform some action after being registered (e.g. choosing a discipline). Thus, there is a clear need for expressing an application-specific obligation in a flexible way; enforcing obligations with a security monitor has obvious advantages: it is language and application independent, and can be found in a large number of environments (virtual machines, operating systems, etc.).
The difficulty of enforcing obligation with a monitor is that it imposes dependencies in the future and as pointed out by Schneider [11] , polices with dependencies in the future cannot be enforced by security monitors. However, we will show in this paper that there is a class of obligations, including the examples presented above, that can be ruled by a security policy and enforced by a security monitor. This is achieved with the help of the transaction concept: an action that is to be enforced in the future, because it is an obligation according to the defined policy, is part of a transaction that commits successfully only if the obligatory action has been done. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present some related work. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe our solution for enforcing obligation with a security monitor, and clearly identify the situations in which the concept of obligation is needed, respectively. In Section 5 we present the most important implementation aspects of our system along with some performance results. Section 6 resumes the contributions of the paper.
Related Work
Most access control models are based on the concepts of permission or prohibition, e.g. someone is allowed or forbidden to perform some action on something. These concepts, when used together, may lead to potential conflicts which must be solved by some sort of conflict handler. Nevertheless, several models use both concepts together in order to increase their expressiveness [1, 2, 8] , hence allowing for more compact, readable and powerful security policies.
[4] defined a modal logic based on deontic logic that integrates the concepts of permission and prohibition with the obligation concept. However, although he presents a clear definition of obligation, he does not propose a solution to enforce it within an access control service.
Schneider, in [11] , draw the boundaries of policies enforceable by a monitor-like security service. He showed that several important types of security policies are not enforceable by monitor-like security services, including policies with dependencies in the future such as obligation, and defined the conditions under which some other types are enforceable. Although our results seem contradictory, they are in fact consistent, because we assume a different but useful execution environment.
We are not aware of any other work similar to ours, i.e. there are no proposals for enforcing obligations with security monitors.
Enforceable Obligations
To act upon security policies, an access control service must know when those policies are violated and what to do when that happens. On most access control services, rules based on permission and prohibition concepts are violated when an event requesting an action occurs and, in that case, the action requested is denied. The difficulty with rules based on obligation is that the time at which a violation occurs and the action to perform when that happens are not so easy to instantiate on a particular instant and action, respectively. First, because a generic obligation (Statement 1) does not need to have a deadline and second because there is not a generic action (equal for every situation) to perform in case of violation.
Principal O must do Action O
However, obligation rules are seldom generic. Often what the security manager wants to express is "Conditional Obligations", in which obligations are triggered by pre-condition events (Statement 2)
Unlike the generic obligation, a conditional obligation has a simple solution for default action. While with the generic type of obligation a system is in an unsafe 1 state until the obligation is fulfilled, with the conditional obligation a system has two safe states, one before the activating event (Action T) and one after the obligation (Action O) is fulfilled. Thus, on the impossibility of fulfilling the obligation and reach the final safe state, the natural default action for the system, with this type of obligation, is to return to the safe state before the activating event.
Nevertheless, conditional obligations cannot be enforced solely by a standard security monitor. Using simple logic it is possible to rewrite statement 2 into statement 3
2 , which specifies a policy with a dependency on a future event.
Principal T cannot do Action T if Principal O will not do Action O
Schneider [11] states that it is not possible, with a monitor like construction, to enforce a security policy in which the acceptability of an event depends on possible future events. Informally his argument is quite simple. Given the executions (sequence of events) τ and τ , in which τ is the prefix of some execution τ , it is not possible to allow τ on the basis that one of its extensions τ is allowed by the security policy, because the system could stop before τ , and the system would have failed to enforce the policy.
The key issue that differentiates our work from Schneider's is the underlying model of execution. While to Schneider a system evolves through units of execution controlled by the security manager, which are independent from each other, to us those units may be organized in atomic sequences, thus depending on each other. By atomic we mean in the sense of transactions' ACID properties: either all happen or none happens, we do not mean indivisibility. In fact, in transactional environments most units of execution controlled by the security service are already part of atomic sequences of executions; thus, our solution is particularly suitable for those environments.
Inside these atomic sequences of execution it is possible to define security policies with dependencies in future actions, because it is not possible for a system to stop execution leaving the sequence incomplete.
Therefore security policies with dependencies in the future are enforceable but only if they are confined to the bounds of an atomic execution. Thus, for a conditional obligation policy to be enforceable, the violation time must be less or equal than the upper bound of an atomic execution.
Albeit restricted to the bounds of atomic sequence of executions, this type of policy (conditional obligation) is useful for several situations, e.g. an user is obliged to register after it starts using a given software, or in implementing the information flow policy presented in section 5.2.
As previously mentioned, an atomic sequence of executions is generically referred as a transaction. There are several ways to implement transactions [7] , namely by keeping an undo-log with the information needed to reset the system to the initial state in case of failure, or by defining compensating actions for those actions that cannot be undone but can be compensated. However there are some actions that cannot be undone or compensated, e.g. sending a document to a printer. These actions are called real actions on transaction management systems [7] and are already known to require special treatment by those systems in order to achieve atomicity. Usually the system delays the execution of such actions until all other actions are executed and only if every other action has been successfully executed; but if the action cannot be reordered the system is not able to ensure atomicity.
In implementing security obligation the problem is slightly more complex than in usual transaction management systems because the set of actions, identified as real actions, must include actions that change human knowledge state (e.g. showing some text on the screen), which are not dealt by most transactional management systems. Although relevant, the implementation of such a transactional management system is out of the scope of this paper.
Obligation examples
Although the conditional obligation presented in the previous section is a very simple and common concept, not every statement expressing a conditional obligation in common language requires an obligation-based policy to be enforced. For instance, the statement -"if someone executes some application he must register as a user" -contains a conditional obligation but it can usually be expressed as a conditional prohibition with a dependency in the past: "Someone may execute an application if he has registered as a user". Thus it is necessary to clearly identify the situations where an obligation-based policy must be used.
We have identified two generic situations where an obligation-based policy is required. The first one occurs when the two actions involved in a conditional obligation (statement 2), oblige each other. For instance, the situation describe before, where someone is obliged to register as student of at least one discipline if he has register as student of the Online University and vice versa. In this situation it is not possible to rewrite the statement has a conditional prohibition, because whatever action is performed first there is always an obligation to fulfill.
The second situation occurs when the obligatory action is causally dependent on the triggered action. For instance if the obligatory action requires some value obtained by the trigger action, the obligatory action cannot be executed before the trigger action, forbidding the transformation of the conditional obligation into a conditional prohibition.
Implementing Enforceable Obligations
We have implemented the obligation concept within our access control framework. This framework is composed of a security policy language (SPL) [10] and its compiler, and several tools to verify the policy consistency and cross-consistency with other organization's policies (e.g. policies expressed within workflow specifications) [9] .
In this section we briefly describe our security language; show some examples of security policies comprising the obligation concept, expressed in that language; and finally describe the process by which the compiler enforces obligation-based policies.
Security policy language (SPL)
SPL is a security language designed to express policies that aim at deciding about the acceptability of events. The acceptability of each event depends on the properties of the event (e.g. author, target and action), on the context at that time and on the properties of past and future events. SPL entities are typed entities with an explicit interface by which their properties can be queried. Some of the entities manipulated by SPL are internal to SPL, e.g. rules and policies, but most are external, such as users, files actions, objects and events. The properties of each external entity depend heavily on the platform (e.g. operating system, workflow engine) that implements those entities.
The language is organized in a hierarchical delegation tree of security policies, in which the master policy is the root delegation starting point. A SPL policy is a structure composed of sets and rules, whose purpose is to express simple concepts like "separation of duty", "information flow", or "general access control".
Sets contain the entities used by the policies to decide on events acceptability. A rule is a function of events, and may assume three values: "allow", "deny" and "notapply". Its purpose is to decide on the acceptability of the current event. A rule can be simple or composed. A simple rule is a tuple of two logical expressions. The first logical expression decides on the applicability of the rule, and the second decides on the acceptability of the event.
A rule can be composed of other rules through a specific three-value algebra with five logic operations: conjunction ('AND); disjunction ('OR); negation ('NOT); existential quantification (EXIST x IN set rule); and universal quantification (FORALL x IN set rule). These operations behave similarly to their binary homonyms if the "notapply" value is not used and the "allow" and "deny" values are used as true and false, respectively. The primary characteristic of this algebra is that the "notapply" value is the neutral element of every operation. For further properties and constructions allowed by this algebra, see [10] .
Each policy has one special rule called the "query rule" which is identified by a question mark before the name. This rule is usually a composition of other rules in the policy and defines the behavior of the policy after being instantiated. Delegation is achieved when a policy is instantiated and used as a rule in the composition of other rules. Figure 1 shows a simple policy stating that documents internal to the organization defining the policy cannot be sent to someone outside the organization. The policy has two sets and one rule (the query rule). One of the sets is a parameter to the policy and contains the users that belong to the organization. The other is internal to the policy and contains the documents internal to the organization. The rule uses the special variable "ce" to access the current event properties. The applicability expression of the rule states that the policy is defined only for events whose targets are documents internal to the department and whose action is to send an Email. The acceptability expression states that for those events that satisfy the applicability expression the only events allowed are the ones that sent the Email to a user inside the organization. One of SPL key features is its ability to express policies with dependencies on past events (history-based policies). For instance, on the Chinese Wall policy [3] targets are classified into classes of conflicting interest and each principal may access every target but only one from each class of interest. Thus an event accessing one target is denied if the same principal has previously issued another event to access a target in the same class of interest.
In SPL history-based policies are expressed by quantification rules. These rules declare and quantify an event variable over an abstract special set (PastEvents). This variable is used to identify the type of past event which should be traced by the security service. Figure 2 shows one description of the Chinese Wall policy in SPL. The policy defines one set and one rule. The set contains all the objects with the same conflict of interests. The rule states that the current event is denied if the target of the event is in the "interest class" and exists a past event performed by the same user on a different target that belongs to that "interest class". Usually an organization implementing a Chinese Wall policy has several classes of conflicting interests. The above policy has just one class, but can be instantiated several times, one for each class of interest.
The decide-expression of the rule has a constant value, which is consistent with the monotonicity of the Chinese Wall definition. This definition specifies the events that must be denied but leaves for complementary policies the decision upon the ones that are accepted.
Expressing obligations
Expressing an obligation-based policy in SPL is as simple as expressing a history-based policy. As mentioned in section 3, the kind of obligations enforced by SPL can be expressed as policies with dependencies in the future. Therefore, by symmetry with the polices with dependencies in the past, the natural way to express an obligation constraint in SPL is using quantification rules over a special abstract set FutureEvents. Each rule declares and quantifies one event variable, used to classify each type of future event which should be monitored. Figure 3 shows an obligation based policy which states that if someone executes the goodies application he must eventually (in the near future) register as a user. Here we do not specify why the policy must be expressed as an obligation. It may be because the "register" action is causally dependent on the "execute" action, or it may be because there is another policy that specifies a symmetric obligation.
Obligation can also be used to express more complex types of security policies. Figure 4 shows an example of an information flow policy which uses obligation to force applications to register the information flow originated by them into SPL rules.
This policy is not a strict information flow policy in the sense that it cannot handle implicit flows, as defined in [5] . However, in some situations [6] the information leak resulting from implicit flows does not poses a serious security risk, either because the information on variables determining the sequence of execution is pub- lic or because it is not possible to infer the sequence of executions from the results of that sequence. For these situations it is possible to define information flow policies enforceable by event monitors, because the regulation of explicit information flow from storage to storage can be performed with just the knowledge on past events properties.
The ?infoFlow rule of Figure 4 traces indirect information flow between read and write events performed by the same task. This rule states that every rule applicable to the protected objects read by some task must also be applicable to the objects written by that task.
Implementing Obligation-based policies
As explained in Section 3, obligation-based security policies enforceable by event monitors are only those that can be completely resolved inside an atomic execution. The monitor generated by the SPL compiler does not include code to enforce atomicity of sequences of actions; instead, it relies on applications to define the sequences of atomic actions and on an external transaction monitor to implement it. Thus, the problem of enforcing obligation-based security policies is reduced to allowing or not the event that instructs the transaction monitor to commit a transaction, whether or not every obligation was fulfilled at the time of that event.
A security policy that allows or denies an event (the commit event) depending on whether or not some events were executed (the obligations) is a history-based policy. Thus, the enforcement of an obligation-based policy controlling a particular type of event can be done by a history-based policy controlling the commit-event.
The transformation from the obligation-based policy to the history-based policy can be achieved in two steps. The first step, called "aging" (Figure 5 ), consists of replacing references to events by older references. References to the current event are replaced by references to a past event called "trigger-event". References to past events are replaced by references to other past events with an additional constraint specifying their occurrence before the trigger-event. References to future events are replaced by references to past events with the additional constraint of occurring after the trigger-event.
The second step consists of inserting in this policy an explicit reference to the event that requests the transaction commit. This event becomes the current event of the new policy and is related with the trigger-event by means of the transaction Id in which trigger-event was performed. Figure 4 . Aging makes every reference to the current event (ce) be replaced by a reference to a new event variable (te), which is declared and quantified over the PastEvents set (new line (a)). The lines (b) and (c) define the type of events controlled by the transformed policy. This policy controls the execution of events committing transactions on which events of type te (old current event) were executed. The extra lines (d) and (e) establish a chronological order between past events.
Although expressing history-based policies is often straightforward, they are usually difficult to enforce efficiently [12] , due to the need to maintain and query a record of past events.
In [10] we show that it is possible to efficiently implement this type of policies using compilation-time techniques. For lack of space we present here only some results for the Information Table 1 : Delay in µs on the commit-event due to the security verification . The results were taken for transactions with different number of read and write events, over different objects and over a fixed set of 10 objects.
All measurements were taken on a personal computer with a Pentium II at 333MHz running the Sun Java 1.2.2 virtual machine over Windows NT 4.0. Table 1 presents delay on a commit-event of a transaction encompassing several reads and writes to objects. For this policy the delay on any other type of event is negligible.
The table shows that the delay on the commit-event due to the security verification is independent from the number of reads and writes performed during the transaction, but it is dependent on the number of different objects accessed. A more detailed analysis shows that this delay is primarily dependent on the number of objects written. This is due to the nature and amount of information that must be kept by the monitor to decide on the acceptability of the commit-event. For further details on the implementation see [10] . Nevertheless, the important observation is that all the time values presented in Table 1 are less than 1ms, which is negligible compared to the actual commit time.
Conclusion
We have identified a restricted type of obligation which is simultaneously useful to express the security policies of large organizations and can be enforceable by security monitors. This type of obligation includes the following generic situations: i) when the two actions involved in a conditional obligation oblige each other, and ii) when the obligatory action is causally dependent on the triggered action.
Our approach consists on using the transaction concept to delay the actual security monitoring until the commit time; thus, avoiding the problem of future dependency inherent to any obligation policy.
We have developed a security language and a compiler encompassing the obligation paradigm, and the performance results show that it can be efficiently implemented.
This work is part of the development of a security framework which also includes the specification and enforcement of authentication policies, tools to verify the consistency of both authentication and authorization policies and tools to verify the cross consistency of both specifications with other systems in an organization.
